Designing Health Insurance Exchanges: Key Decisions by Starc, Amanda & Kolstad, Jonathan T
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Issue Briefs Leonard Davis Institute of Health Economics
3-7-2012
Designing Health Insurance Exchanges: Key
Decisions
Amanda Starc
Jonathan T. Kolstad
University of Pennsylvania
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/ldi_issuebriefs
Part of the Health Services Administration Commons, and the Health Services Research
Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/ldi_issuebriefs/99
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Starc, Amanda and Kolstad, Jonathan T.. Designing Health Insurance Exchanges: Key Decisions. LDI Issue Briefs. 2012; 17 (5).
http://ldi.upenn.edu/policy/issue-briefs/2012/03/07/designing-health-insurance-exchanges-key-decisions
Designing Health Insurance Exchanges: Key Decisions
Abstract
A cornerstone of health care reform is the establishment of state-level insurance exchanges where individuals
and small businesses can purchase health insurance in an online marketplace. This report reviews the
experience of Massachusetts in developing a health insurance exchange and offers policymakers guidance on
key features and likely consumer responses.
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Key Decisions
Editor’s note: A cornerstone of health care reform is the establishment of state-level 
insurance exchanges where individuals and small businesses can purchase health 
insurance in an online marketplace. States are required to develop an exchange 
by 2014, or participate in a federal one. The exchanges will help people without 
employer-sponsored insurance find and choose a health plan to meet their needs. 
This Issue Brief reviews the experience of Massachusetts in developing a health 
insurance exchange and offers policymakers guidance on key features and likely 
consumer responses. 
The 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) mandates that all 
Americans carry health insurance and requires that states establish “health benefit 
exchanges” to facilitate individual purchase of health insurance. When fully 
operational, the exchanges will be the portal for an estimated 24 million people to 
purchase health insurance.
•	 Exchanges	serve	both	a	retail	and	regulatory	function.	Exchanges	help	connect	
individuals with insurers, potentially reducing transaction costs and search 
costs—the retail function. However, exchanges also make substantive decisions 
that shape how the insurance market works—the regulatory function.
•	 States	have	substantial	latitude	in	designing	and	regulating	these	exchanges, 
and the choices they make will shape the market for individually-purchased 
health insurance. But little is known about how consumers will act in such 
settings. Understanding consumer demand in exchanges and the incentives of 
insurers is important for predicting what will happen and whether social goals 
will be achieved.
•	 Massachusetts	is	ahead	of	other	states	in	its	experience	with	health	insurance	
exchanges and may provide insight into key policy decisions for other states and 
their likely impact.
States will develop websites 
to encourage “one-stop” 
shopping for health insurance
Ericson and Starc analyzed the choices consumers made in the unsubsidized 
exchange and identified the potential for strategic insurer behavior given 
these choices. 
•	 The	data	include	24,196	enrollees	ages	27-64	who	signed	up	for	individual	
coverage	through	the	Commonwealth	Choice	program	from	July	2007	to	
December	2009.	The	analysis	excluded	enrollees	26	and	under	because	they	
could choose a separate set of Young Adult Plans, which are less generous than 
the bronze plans.
•	 Ericson	and	Starc	supplemented	these	data	with	detailed	price	quotes	taken	in	
November	and	December	2009,	to	capture	the	set	of	prices	consumers	actually	
faced. Consumers picked a plan from a set available to them at posted prices, 
which	varied	by	age	and	zip	code.	This	subset	includes	1,059	enrollees.
•	 Using	the	price	data,	the	investigators	estimated	a	model	of	consumer	choice	
that accounts for price, whether the plan was the cheapest available, and the age 
of the enrollee. 
Study examines 
consumer behavior in 
the Massachusetts exchange
In	2007,	Massachusetts	established	a	state-wide	insurance	exchange	and	
an individual mandate to obtain insurance. The exchange (the “Health 
Connector”) facilitates individual and small-group purchase of insurance 
through the Commonwealth Choice Program and through a separate, subsidized 
Commonwealth Care program for low-income people. Prior to Massachusetts 
health	reform,	89.5%	of	residents	were	insured.	Today,	98%	are	insured.
The Connector shapes the market for individual coverage in Massachusetts in a 
number of ways. It operates the exchange’s website and chooses which features of 
insurance plans are highlighted. It determines the “minimum creditable coverage 
(MCC)” a plan can offer to comply with the insurance mandate. It also regulates 
premiums through modified community rating rules.
•	 In	Massachusetts,	MCC	is	defined	as	a	policy	that	provides	prescription	drug	
coverage, three check-ups, caps deductibles at $2,000 for an individual and 
$4,000 for a family, and caps out-of-pocket expenditures at $5,000 for an 
individual and $10,000 for a family.
•	 The	Connector	groups	plans	into	three	categories,	from	least	to	most	generous:	
bronze, silver, and gold. The actuarial value (percent of health costs insured for a 
typical	individual)	is	55%	for	bronze,	70%-80%	for	silver,	and	85%-95% 
for gold.
•	 The	Connector	has	applied	“modified	community	rating”	rules	to	the	
Commonwealth Choice program. Specifically, rates for the same product have 
to fall within a 2:1 band across ages and geography: for a given plan, the highest 
quoted premium can be at most twice the lowest quoted premium. In addition, 
no medical underwriting is allowed, and plans are guaranteed issue (you 
cannot be denied) and guaranteed renewable (your plan cannot be cancelled 
by the insurer).
Massachusetts has operated 
a health insurance exchange 
since 2007
Continued on back.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS By analyzing consumer behavior in the Massachusetts exchange, this work 
provides early insight for policymakers who design health insurance exchanges, 
and for researchers who study such exchanges. The results indicate that the plans 
consumers choose in an exchange setting are markedly different from the demand 
in existing markets. In the Connector, a forerunner of the mandated state-wide 
exchanges, consumers gravitate toward the cheapest and least generous plans. 
•	 Given	consumer	demand,	how	an	exchange	defines	minimum	creditable	
coverage and how it applies modified community rating will be critically 
important. State exchange designers should not only consider the nature of 
consumer demand, but also how insurers might price and market their products 
in response to consumer demand and regulation. 
•	 Some	of	these	policy	issues	have	been	addressed	in	the	ACA,	but	many	of	
the details remain to be worked out. Four tiers of plans will be offered, with 
AGE TRENDS IN CHOICE 
AND COST OF PLANS 
Notes: Solid line shows the fraction 
of each age category choosing a 
bronze generosity plan. The dashed 
line shows the average cost of a 
gold plan minus the average cost 
of a bronze plan, averaged over all 
enrollees in each age category.
Most people choose 
lower-cost plans
The results indicate that consumers gravitate toward the cheapest alternative, and 
that some consumers are more sensitive to price than others. 
•	 A	majority	of	enrollees	(60%)	chose	a	bronze	tier	plan,	the	lowest	level	of	
coverage	sufficient	to	satisfy	the	mandate.	About	30%	chose	the	silver	tier,	and	
just	10%	chose	the	gold	tier.	
•	 The	plans	chosen	by	consumers	in	the	exchange	differ	from	the	typical	
employer-sponsored insurance plan. The bronze plan is less generous that the 
typical employer plan. While bronze plans have an actuarial value of about 
55%,	typical	employer-sponsored	HMO	and	PPO	plans	have	actuarial	values	of	
80%-93%.
•	 About	20%	of	enrollees	chose	the	cheapest	plan	available	to	them.	The	average	
premium paid was $420 per month. 
•	 Sensitivity	to	price	varies	by	age.	As	the	graph	below	shows,	the	percentage	of	
enrollees choosing bronze plans remains roughly constant across ages, while the 
marginal cost of choosing a more generous plan nearly doubles. This indicates 
that older consumers have a lower distaste for price, a higher preference for 
more generous coverage, or both.
•	 Results	of	the	model	of	consumer	choice	indicate	that	the	youngest	individual	
(age	27)	is	twice	as	sensitive	to	price	as	a	64	year	old.	The	effect	of	being	the	
cheapest plan available remains significant at both ages, amounting to a 
price	reduction	of	$26	a	month	for	the	27	year	old	and	$46	a	month	for	a 
64	year	old.
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POLICY IMPLICATIONS
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differing	actuarial	values:	bronze	(60%),	silver	(70%)	gold	(80%)	and	platinum	
(90%).	The	plans	will	differ	based	on	the	cost	sharing	they	require,	not	the	
benefits they offer. 
•	 The	ACA	mandates	modified	community	rating	across	plans	in	a	way	similar	
to Massachusetts, except that premiums can vary by age by a factor of three 
(meaning that a plan can charge an older enrollee three times the premium of 
a	younger	enrollee).	Given	the	finding	that	older	people	are	less	price	sensitive	
than younger people, insurers may have a large incentive to increase premiums 
to older consumers.
•	 The	constitutionality	of	the	federal	individual	mandate	is	now	before	the	
Supreme Court. Some commentators have questioned whether community 
rating rules are feasible without having everyone in the system. This decision 
will	have	a	major	impact	on	how	and	whether	exchanges	can	deliver	on	the	
promise of facilitating coverage, choice, and competition in the health 
insurance marketplace.
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